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Unfinished Symphony: The Complex Litigation Project Rests
Linda S.Mullenix"

I. INTRODUCTION

The American Law Institute's (ALl) Complex Litigation Project,' approved
at the May 1993 Annual Meeting, represents nothing so much as several fine
movements of an otherwise unfinished symphony. Although the membership
endorsed this final draft, it prematurely laid the Project to rest. Had the eminent
composers been permitted to continue, Congress and thejudicial system might have
benefitted from a more polished, complete work. Instead, as the Reporters
previewed each successive movement, it became apparent that the Reporters, as
conductors, were having difficulty getting their distinguished orchestra to play their
themes harmoniously.
Similar to the Institute's 1969 Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between
State and Federal Courts, 2 the Complex Litigation Project seems destined to
represent amassive, engaging intellectual exercise ratherthan apragmatic blueprint
that Congress will enact for the conduct of complex litigation. Indeed, the ALI's
1969 study now seems prescient in its recommendation of a minimal diversity
requirement for complex cases, 3 ajurisdictional recommendation that appeared in
early drafts of the Complex Litigation Project but that subsequently disappeared.4
Moreover, since 1987 at least, Congress has been marching to its own
drummer with regard to enacting procedural reforms concerning complex
litigation.' For the past six years, each new legislative session has witnessed the
reintroduction of yet another revised version of the Multiparty, Multiforum
Jurisdiction Act.6 While the House Judiciary Committee has not been oblivious

Copyright 1994. by LOUISIANA LAW RcvIEfw.
Bernard J. ward Centennial Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law.
B.A. 1971, The City College of New York; M. Phil., 1974, Ph.D. 1977, Columbia University; J.D.,
1980. Georgetown University Law Center. The author was a member of the ALI Consultative Group
on the Complex Litigation Project.
I. American Law Institute. Complex Litigation Project. Proposed Final Draft (May 13, 1993)
[hereinafter Proposed Final Draft]. The Reporter tor the Project is Professor Arthur R. Miller,
Harvard Law School, and the Associate Reporter is Professor May Kay Kane, University of
California, Hastings College or Law.
2. See American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts (1969).
3. Id. §§ 2371, 2374.
4. See Linda S.Mullenix, Comple.r Litigation Reform ndArticle III Jurisdiction.59 Fordham
L. Rev. 169. 181-91 (1990).
5. See Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988. H.R. 3152. 100th Cong.. Ist Sess.
(1987); Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989);
Multiparty. Multiforun Jurisdiction Act of 1990, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); The
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1991. H.R. 2450. 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991);
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1993, H.R. 1100, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993).
6. See the various versions of the Multiparty. Multiforum Jurisdiction Act. supra note 5. Id.
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to the American Law Institute's parallel efforts, the Judiciary Committee's
legislative proposals have reflected more the handiwork of legislative lobbying
and compromise than the work product of platonic proceduralists. Without being
cynical about either the American Law Institute or Congress, it seems rather
dubious that with the Complex Litigation Project now completed, Congress will
actually adopt the ALI's Proposed Final Draft.

That the Complex Litigation Project's recommendations probably will not
become law should not trouble academic proceduralists and should comfort those
practicing lawyers who dislike many of the Project's recommendations. As with
many ALI enterprises, the development of the Reporters' proposals served to
heighten the different perspectives of the academic and practicing legal
communities. Throughout, the academicians approached the task of complex
litigation reform with the mindset of the physics professor confronted with a
cosmic problem. The academicians asked: "If I had to construct a set of ideal
rules for the conduct of complex mass tort cases, what would they look like?"
To answer their question, the academicians proceeded from a vantage of purist
zeal to create platonic rules. The ALI's practicing members, however, brought
to bear a pragmatic litigation experience tempered by the perceived interests of
their clients. The predictable result of this clash of sensibilities is a mediated
final draft that compromises or evades sticky points (state inter-system
consolidation of cases),' offers amalgamated something-for-everyone solutions
(choice-of-law rules), 9 or simply omits difficult problems (jurisdiction).'0
Much has already been written about various proposals in the multiple drafts
of the Complex Litigation Project," and the purpose of this essay is not to
§ 6. See generallyLinda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice ofLaw for Mass.Tort Litigation, 70 Tex.
L. Rev. 1623 (1992); Louise Weinberg, Mass Torts at tie Neutral Forum: A Critical Analysis ofthe
ALI's Proposed Choice Rule, 56 AIb. L. Rev. 807 (1993).
7. This is not to suggest that the ALl membership divided tidily between its academic and
practicing bar members. Indeed, many academicians and practitioners disagreed among themselves
as to the appropriate nature of sound recommendations for dealing with complex litigation. But, in
gross, the academics tended to approach the Complex Litigation Project with something of adifferent
mind-set than the practicing members of the Institute,
8.
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, at Appendix B ("A Model System for State to State

Transfer and Consolidation"). Because neither the American Law Institute nor Congress can require
state-to-state transfer of mass tort cases, or of any other cases for that matter, the Institute could

merely offer a suggested model for such transfer of cases.
9. Id. Ch. 6 (Choice of Law).
10. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
II.
See, e.g.. Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. Ill.
L.
Rev. 105 (1989); Mary Kay Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rules for Complex Litigation: Some

Preliminar, Thoughts, 10 Rev. Litig. 309 (1991); Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality
Controversy, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 457 (1991). Mullenix, supra note 6; Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond
Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 475 (1991); Linda S. Mullenix, Problems in Complex Litigation. 10 Rev. Litig. 213 (1991);
Mullenix, supra note 4; Diana E.Murphy, Unified and Consolidated Complaints in Multidistrict
Litigation, 132 F.R.D. 597 (1991): Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis, State Sovereignty, and
Federally-Mandated Choice of Law in "Mass Tort" Cases. 56 Atb. L. Rev. 855 (1993); Robert A.
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revisit the debates surrounding the final formulations of the Project's recommendations. Rather, this essay explores the notion that the Complex Litigation
Project is indeed an unfinished symphony that should be evaluated as much for
what it does not say as for what it does say.
Efforts such as the Complex Litigation Project defy sweeping judgments
concerning their. success or failure. Obviously, if Congress or various states
enact the Project's recommendations in whole or in part, and if these measures
facilitate the conduct of complex mass tort cases, then the Project properly may
be deemed a success. But this assessment is a long term prospect. From another
perspective, the Complex Litigation Project was a smashing success as a pure
academic exercise, having provided hearty grist for the academic scholarship and
debate mills. The project was challenging, irksome, entertaining, and fun. Many
in the academic community, no doubt, are sorry to see it go.

Yet from still another perspective, the Complex Litigation Project may be
deemed a failure of will and imagination. At the outset the Institute and the
Reporters deliberately limited the scope of the Project, and as a result, the
Complex Litigation Project in the end simply failed to address the myriad
problems that collectively characterize complex mass tort cases. The Reporters'
and the Project's obsessive focus on the problems of jurisdiction, transfer, and
applicable law reduced the phenomenon of complex litigation to a caricature of
the actually-litigated mass tort case. Ultimately, the final draft fails to deal in
a holistic fashion with the interrelated issues of complex cases.
This essay documents what the Reporters left out by design, inadvertence,
or other unknowable reasons.' 2 Although the Project began in 1986 and the
Reporters issued their first Preliminary Study' 3 in 1987, for many observers the

Sedler and Aaron D. Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass Tort Legislation:
Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 Marq. L. Rev. 76 (1989); Weinberg. supra note 6; Jack B.Weinstein and.
Eileen B. Hershenov. The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 269 (1992);
Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resohling Conflict.of.LawProblems in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989

U. Ill. L. Rev. 129 (1989).
12. It isdifficult, if not impossible, to know in many instances why the Reporters made certain
substantive and editorial decisions concerning the scope and details of the Project, unless the
Reporters specifically indicated the reasons in the Reporter's Notes. Scholars should be cautioned,
however, that the Reporter's Notes (although they now embody the official record of the ALl
membership), may not reflect the entire legislative history of the Project. For example, some
decisions, such as the decision to abandon ajurisdictional proposal, are not recorded in the final draft.
Therefore, scholars studying the final draft will have few cles to the prior existence of such a
proposal and its subsequent abandonment. Instead, this decision is memorialized in a memorandum
to members. of the ALl Council, meeting in November 1989. a memorandum that is not generally
known or available to non-ALl members. See Mullenix, supra note 4.at 181 n.67. Scholars desiring
to understand various proposals need to study the various redraftings of the Project for signposts to
controversial issues. But beyond the drfits, certain debates over various recommendations exist as
oral rather than written history, having been articulated at the various meetings of ALl constituencies,
such as the Consultative Group, the Advisory Committee, and the Council.
13. American Law Institute. Report. Preliminary Study of Complex Litigation (March 31. 1987)
thereinafter Preliminary Study).
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Complex Litigation Project seems to have been prematurely aborted in 1993 after
seven years of work. Unexpectedly, the Complex Litigation Project ended; the
ALI membership was informed of this Project interruptus. The Project's end left
many of those unprepared for its unforeseeable demise wondering when the
Reporters were going to deal with certain troubling issues. For some, the
Project's abrupt termination left a sense of incompleteness: of music not written,
of movements undone.
The pieces that were left out of the Complex Litigation Project are as
important as the ones there, primarily because the Project does not solve the
many problems of complex litigation, let alone mass tort litigation.' 4 The
Project really does only two things: it revamps the old multidistrict litigation
statute (tinkers with, is perhaps a better concept) and offers an elaborate choiceof-law scheme. But that is all it does. The Reporters set out to compose The
Rite of Spring, but then settled on scoring the flittings of two wood nymphs. We
certainly are not the worse for this, but it is hard to say that we are the better.
II. THE COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT: THE MISSING PIECES
It is, of course, well known that it is difficult if not impossible to prove a
negative. It is equally difficult to document the missing, because the missing
tends to leave scant record of itself. In this spirit, the final draft of the Complex
Litigation Project is interesting for three categories of phantasma that haunt its
pages: proposals that vanished mysteriously, problems that were omitted
deliberately, and issues that were ignored inadvertently (perhaps). This is the
story of the ghosts of the Complex Litigation Project.
A. ProposalsMysteriously Vanished
Two crucial issues central to designing a procedural scheme for mass tort
litigation concerned federal court jurisdiction over such cases, as well as the

14. One of the many anomalies of the Complex Litigation Project isthat its title issomething
of a misnomer; the Project really was designed and intended to deal with the then emerging problem
of mass tort litigation, rather than any other type of complex litigation. The Project's main goal at
the outset was to revise the multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988) (Added Pub. L.
No. 90-296, § 1,82 Stat. 109 (1968)). As such, the Project ought to have been retitled the Complex
Mass Tort Litigation Project. See Preliminary Study. supra note 13. at 1-6, 48-54.
This makes a difference because mass tort cases are different than other complex litigation in the
federal courts. Most other complex litigation, such as securities, antitrust, or discrimination cases,
are jurisdictionally based in federal substantive law. Mass ton litigation, on the contrary, typically
originates as state tort law cases and therefore has presented vastly different issues for transfer,
consolidation, and applicable law.
Through the final May 1993 meeting, the Reporters retained the working title of Complex
Litigation Project. At that final meeting. Judge Jack Weinstein challenged the Project in its entirety
for the Reponer's failure to narrowly define the scope of the Project's recommendations to mass tort
cases. See 1993 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute (forthcoming).
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relationship of federally consolidated cases to Rule 23 class action litigation.
Recognizing the centrality of jurisdictional problems embodied in mass tort
cases, the Reporters grappled with the jurisdictional issue in the early stages of
the Project, only to abandon this effort. As for the relationship of consolidated
mass tort cases to the Rule 23 federal class action, the Reporters repeatedly
informed the ALI membership that this problem would be dealt with separately
at a later time. Later never came. By May 1993, both federal jurisdiction and
Rule 23 complications had, well, mysteriously vanished. The Reporters, in the
end, did not deliver on either issue.
I. Original Federal Court Jurisdiction
Although the Reporters recognized that mass tort cases are filed in both state
and federal courts and the Project's final draft includes a model proposal for
state-to-state consolidation of mass tort cases," the Reporters' main focus was
on the problem of transferring and consolidating mass tort cases within the
federal system. Insofar as mass tort cases are not based in any federal
substantive law providing federal question jurisdiction, these cases have presented
jurisdictional complications arising from the nature of the typical mass tort
cases- multiple parties from multiple states suing in multiple forums.
Thus, federal mass tort cases either originally have failed to meet the
requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction or could not be transferred and
consolidated because this procedure would also violate the complete diversity
rule. The existing multidistrict litigation statute, 6 enacted with antitrust law in
mind, failed to alleviate the problems raised by transfer of diversity-based federal
cases.' 7 The Reporters first approached their task of drafting a federal
intersystem transfer-and-consolidation statute by beginning with this jurisdictional
problem, their aim being to provide for federal subject matter jurisdiction for
mass tort cases.' 8
As early as 1989 the Reporters offered a jurisdictional proposal (Section

15. See supra note 8.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
17. See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. and Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal
MuIliparqv, Muiriforuwi Jurisdiction, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev, 7 (1986) (proposing modification of the
multidistrict litigation statute to require only minimal, as opposed to complete, diversity for diversitybased mass tort cases); see also Mullenix, supra note 4, at 174 (discussing this problem and
proposal). The authors were the first to propose a minimal diversity modification to the multidistrict
litigation statute, which had also been recommended in the 1969 ALl study. See supra notes 2-3.
This minimal diversity proposal has been a central feature of each successive version of Congress'
proposed Multiparty. Multiforum Jurisdiction legislation. See supra note 5, § 2 ("Jurisdiction of
District Courts"), adding a new § 1367 to the United States Code ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action involving minimal diversity between adverse paries that arises
from a single [event or accidentl .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1993)).
18. See Mullenix, supra note 4 (describing the history of draft provision § 5.01 and its
subsequent withdrawal; criticizing the analytical basis for the proposed jurisdictional provision).
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5.01) that represented an odd amalgamation of federal question and diversity
elements. The proposed statute was an elaborate scheme of numerosity and
amount-in-controversy requirements,' 9 and this expansive federal jurisdiction
was justified by lofty constitutional law principles.20 For many good and
documented reasons, this odd jurisdictional creation proved highly controversial,
and at its October 1989 meeting, the Advisory Committee for the Complex
Litigation Project rejected the Reporters' recommendation for expanded original
jurisdiction, suggesting that the proposal be withdrawn and revised.2 ' The
Reporters informed the ALI Council of this recommendation in November, and
the Reporters subsequently abandoned any further work on a jurisdictional
proposal.22
The problem of jurisdiction for federally-based mass tort cases remains, and
the Proposed Final Draft for the Project simply does not address this important
issue that was so clear to all at the Project's outset. Instead, the Final Draft
finesses the jurisdictional issue in federal mass tort cases by declaring that
"[fQederal subject-matter jurisdiction is provided by way of removal in §§ 5,015.02."" In this fashion the final version of Section 5.01 is a peculiar ghost of
its ignominious precursor.24 In the Proposed Final Draft, the Reporters have
transmuted the problem of federal mass tort jurisdiction into one of removal of
state-based cases into federal court; in short, the Reporters have merely solved
a different collateral problem relating to the consolidation of all mass tort cases
in a two-tier court system. And' as the Reporters surely know, removal
jurisdiction has nothing at all to do with mass tort cases that are initially filed in
various federal district courts dispersed throughout the federal system.
Section 5.01 in the Proposed Final Draft, purporting to deal with federal
subject matter jurisdiction, is itself a jurisdictional oddity. Under traditional
hornbook rules, federal removal jurisdiction is derivative of valid federal subject
matter jurisdiction; in other words, lacking either valid federal subject matter
jurisdiction or valid diversity jurisdiction, astate-based case may not be removed
to federal court and will be remanded back to state court for lack of federal court
jurisdiction. 25 Section 5.01 instead formulates a new transactional test for
removal and Section 3.02 creates a new Complex Litigation Panel that is to
apply a multifactor test to determine whether "doing so offers a superior means
26
of adjudicating the controversy."

at 37-38
20.
21.
22.
23.

See American Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project, Preliminary Draft No. 2 § 5.01
(Sept. 13. 1989); see also Mullenix. saipra note 4, at 181-83.
See Mullenix. supra note 4. at 183-91.
Id. at 181 n. 66.
Id.. n.67.
See Proposed Final Draft. supra note 1.Ch. 6. Intro. Note, at 268.

24.
25.
(removal
26.

See Preliminary Draft No. 2,supra note 19, §5.01.
See 14A Charles A.Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 3721-3740 (1985)
jurisdiction).
See Proposed Final Draft. supra note 1,§3.02 and §5.01. cmt. a,at 274.

.19.
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Again, although intriguing, the Proposed Final Draft fails to address whether
a state-based case must also initially satisfy traditional federal subject matter
jurisdictional requirements before the case may be removed, or whether the
ALI's proposed Section 5.01 eliminates such federal niceties. The Reporters'
Notes are not illuminating on this tricky point. In addition, if state-based cases
do not have to satisfy traditional federal subject matter requirements to be
removed under the new complex litigation regime, then the possible inconsistency exists of different jurisdictional prerequisites for state-filed and federal-filed
mass tort cases. And, of course, the jurisdictional requirements for mass tort
cases filed in federal court remain unstated; therefore, one must assume that the
same old rules apply and that the existing jurisdictional problems remain.
What can possibly explain this disappointing treatment of the jurisdictional
issues so central to the processing of mass tort cases? First, after the 1989
jurisdictional debacle, the Reporters clearly decided to abandon wholesale any
attempt to create original jurisdiction in the federal district courts. Their reasons,
however, remain unrecorded except for their communication to the Council
concerning the controversy over their initial attempts to resolve this issue.
Additionally, in redefining the jurisdiction problem as a removal problem, the
Reporters made the conscious decision that the preferred route for mass tort
cases is to have them percolate up from the state courts rather than boiling full
steam in the federal system. 7
This is an interesting development on the Reporters' part because it signals,
not a failure of intellect, but an administrative desire to channel mass tort cases
away from the federal system and into state courts."8 The problem of mass tort
cases, one begins to suspect, is not so much rooted in jurisdictional concerns, as
it is in the burdens these cases impose on federal court resources. Thus, if a
problem with enacting a sound federal jurisdictional statute for mass tort cases
exists, then these cases should be filed in state court subject to possible
discretionary removal after being approved by a panel of federal judges. This

27. Id. § 5.01, Reporter's Note I to cmt. a, at 277. In a somewhat remarkable passage, the
Reporters note:
The availability oforiginal complex litigation subject-matter jurisdiction would mean that
the parties need not first file in state court and then petition for removal, avoiding not
only that step but the intrusion of transferring the case from the forum in which it began
to another court. However, removal through the Panel allows that body to gain experience
regarding how consolidated cases best can be handled and what cases are most suitable
for such treatment. This should allow for closer scrutiny, as well as the development of
uniform standards for identifying the cases that should be treated in this fashion. Further,
it avoids the risk that the federal courts will be inundated with new cases because parties

proceed directly to federal court in situations that might be handled better by the state
courts. Thus, at least in the early stages of designing methods of processing multiparty,
multiforum cases, removal jurisdiction is the more cautious choice. It may be that as
more experience is gained, original jurisdiction also should be conferred on the federal
courts.
28.

Id.
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approach may be justified, to boot, with academic rhetoric lauding the use of
state courts as laboratories for the resolution of emerging legal issues.
However, two fundamental problems belie the notion, espoused by the
Proposed Final Draft, that mass tort jurisdictional problems can be treated solely
as a matter of removal jurisdiction. First, and most obviously, the Complex
Litigation Project has failed to supply any original jurisdictional basis for mass
tort cases that are initially filed in federal district court. Even the many tortured
renditions of the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act accomplish this basic
statutory groundwork.29 But second, and more importantly, the Reporter's
notion that mass tort cases ought to originate in state court and be subject to the
removal largesse of federal judges, is wishful thinking. Notwithstanding the
prestige and weight of ALL recommendations, litigants are still free to select their
forum of choice and undoubtedly will continue to choose federal court for
traditional strategic and practical reasons. In the end, that the Reporters and the
Project abandoned its attempt to prescribe some form of original federal
jurisdiction for mass tort cases seems paternalistic and, well, shirking.
2. The Relationship to Rule 23
At various meetings of the advisory and consultative groups of the Complex
Litigation Project, invariably, some member would question the Reporters
concerning the relationship of a proposed recommendation to Rule 23 class
action procedure. Just as invariably, the Reporters would respond that they
intended to discuss the relationship of their recommendations to Rule 23 in some
forthcoming portion of the Project. Although this prospect haunted the Project,
the Reporters never offered this phantom analysis, and none appears in the
Proposed Final Draft.
. It is something of a malapropism to suggest, therefore, that the Project's
announced discussion of Rule 23 mysteriously vanished; it simply never
appeared. This omission is significant because many mass tort cases are initiated
as class action suits.30 It would have been useful, at a minimum, to discover
how the Reporters envisioned their proposals interacting with class action mass
tort cases. One can only assume, if Congress enacts the recommendations of the
Complex Litigation Project, that federal and state courts are now left to their own
devices to decipher the interrelationship between the Project and Rule 23.
This is not to suggest, however, that the Complex Litigation Project makes

29.

See supra note 17.

30. See. e.g., the "Agent Orange" litigation in the Eastern District of New York; Its re Asbestos
School Litigation. 104 F.R.D. 422 (ED. Pa. 1984), re,'d inpanr. 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); /n
re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D.
Mass. 1979). See also Proposed Final Draft, supro note 1,Reporter's Notes to Class Actions, at 3843 (history of mass tort class actions with citations to cases and authorities); 2 American Law
Institute, Reporter's Study, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury 383-93 (April 15, 1991)
Ihereinafter Enterprise Responsibilityl (same).
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no mention of Rule 23 class action procedure.

In the introductory section

canvassing existing joinder possibilities under the current Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 3' the Proposed Final Draft discusses Rule 23 class action procedure
and the relatively recent history of mass tort litigation under this rule.32 But
from the outset, the Reporters decided not to pursue Rule 23 class action
procedure as their preferred mechanism for consolidating and adjudicating mass
tort cases, 33 a choice reaffirmed in the Proposed Final Draft.'
Instead, the
Reporters chose to massage and enhance the existing multidistrict litigation
statute. 35

Certainly the Reporters are not to be faulted for their choice, although the
fans of Rule 23 class action procedure perhaps are disappointed that the
3
Reporters did not take this route in formulating their recommendations.
Indeed, now that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial
Conference has undertaken the task of rewriting Rule 23 yet again,37 it is hoped
that this group of rule revisers will do so with an eye toward the special class
action problems raised by mass tort cases. That the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules is undertaking a revision of the class action rule, however,
complicates the procedural terrain because a more felicitous version of Rule 23
may provide a better vehicle for litigating mass tort cases.
Because the Proposed Final Draft of the Complex Litigation Project leaves
much unsaid about the relationship of its recommendations to class action

31. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, Ch. 3,Intro. Note and Reporter's Notes, at 28-47,
discussing the multidistrict litigation statute, joinder under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 and
20. intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, class actions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. interpleader under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 and the Federal Interpleader Act.
28 U.S.C. § 1335. and bankruptcy proceedings.
32. See supra note 30.
33. See. e.g.. Preliminary Study, supra noie 13. at 34-48, 95-105. 118-29: American Law
Institute, Complex Litigation Project, Tentative Draft No. I, at 36-44 (April 14. 1989).
34. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, Ch. 3, Reporter's Notes 6-16 to Intro. Note, at 3543.
35. According to the Reporters:
The preceding review of consolidation and joinder procedures reveals not only some of
the limits of existing mechanisms, but also some excellent models on which to build. In
particular, the experience under Section 1407 establishes a foundation on which to
construct future improvements. This istrue both because of the practical results that have
been achieved in innumerable cases through its use and because of the innovation and
creativity manifested by the federal judges who have served as transferee judges.
Id. at 46.
36. See. e.g., Linda S.Mullenix, Class Resolution ofthe Mass-Tort Case: AProposed Federal
Procedure Act.64 Tex. L. Rev. 1039 (986): David Rosenberg, Class Actionsfor Mass Torts: Doing
Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 Ind. L. 561 (1987): David Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Erposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
849 (1984).
37. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, Reporter's Note I I to Class Actions, at 42 ("After
more than a decade of inaction, the Advisory Committee has begun in 1993 to consider possible
revisions to the Rule.").
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procedure, many questions remain about how various procedural options are to
function in a coordinated fashion. For example, the Reporters' proposal for
enhancing the current multidistrict litigation statute" seems based on a model
of individual tort cases filed either in state or federal court that are then removed,
transferred, and consolidated in one federal forum. But many mass tort cases
now begin as localized class actions, rather than as individual tort cases. How
then are these localized mass tort class actions to be removed, transferred, and
consolidated under the proposed new version of the multidistrict litigation
statute? What about class certification issues? Will these cases lose their
characterization as class actions through the new transfer and consolidation
procedures?
Because many mass tort cases procedurally originate as class actions, do
class action rules and procedures trump those incorporated in the Proposed Final
Draft, or do Proposed Final Draft procedures supersede class action procedure?39 The proposed new version of the multidistrict litigation statute vests
vast powers in the transferee federal judge receiving complex cases certified by
the Complex Litigation Panel. For instance, the transferee judge has the power
to "certify classes either encompassing the entire litigation or for particular
issues.""0 This kind of power, however, presupposes discrete rather than
previously classed cases, and the Reporters give scant indication what the
transferee judge is to do if the transferred litigation unit consists of preexisting
state or federal class actions.
The Proposed Final Draft glosses over or fails to discuss the problems
inherent in mass tort cases instituted as class actions, intimating that all mass tort
cases may be easily assimilated into the revamped multidistrict litigation statute.
That these methods of joinder and procedure are not inherently compatible or
overlapping is suggested by another ALl project, Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury.4 t In discussing mass tort litigation, the Enterprise Responsibility Reporters suggest two possible class action avenues for consolidating and
adjudicating mass tort cases: one based on the ALl Complex Litigation Project
proposals, and a second model based on mandatory class action procedure.42

38. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
39. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1.§ 3.06. Reporter's Note I to cmt. a.at 136. suggesting,
for example, that the transferee judge's discretion in deciding certification issues may indeed, under
the new proposed procedures, supersede existing certification requirements undercurrent Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.
40. Id. § 3.06(a), at 132-33.
41. See Enterprise Responsibility, supra note 30.
42. Id. at 412-19 (Model 1: Expanded Federal Consolidation) and 419-29 (Model 2:
Augmented Collective Procedures forMass Exposure Cases). The Reporters apparently saw a need

to propose asecond class action model because of perceived deficiencies with the ALl Complex
Litigation Project recommendations foran enhanced multidistrict litigation statute. Thus they
explained the reasons for their Model 2:
The expanded consolidation procedure provided by Model I will be effective in mass
disaster cases in which the harmful effect is temporally and spatially proximate to the
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The Reporters for the Enterprise Responsibility project, at least, recognized that
mass tort class actions could not be easily subsumed by the Complex Litigation
Project's proposed multidistrict procedure.
The Complex Litigation Project's failure to offer some guidance concerning
the relationship of their recommendations to Rule 23 class action procedure
lessens the effectiveness of the Project. Given the large amount of discretion
vested in the Complex Litigation Panel and the transferee judges, undoubtedly
issues of class action procedure will be resolved experientially. However, the
relationship of class action procedure to the Reporter's proposals for enhanced
multidistrict litigation procedure haunted the Project, and Rule 23 issues still
hover unresolved in the background. Furthermore, if the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules promulgates a revised version 'of Rule 23 that more effectively
addresses mass tort cases, then federal litigation will become more interesting,
if not more confusing. One can only hope that this body proceeds with an eye
toward the work of the Complex Litigation Project and makes some effort to
relate Rule 23 class action procedure to the vision of mass tort litigation
embodied in the Complex Litigation Project.
B. Issues Deliberately Omitted
In addition to proposals or analyses that mysteriously vanished from the
Complex Litigation Project, the Project remains an unfinished symphony because
the Institute and the Reporters deliberately omitted several issues from the
Project. The Reporters should not be excoriated for their decision to limit the
scope of their work, a choice that may have been dictated as much by politics,
resources, or energy, as by intellectual concerns. An acknowledgment of these
omissions is instead intended to highlight the Project's artificially constricted
limitations.
The Reporters are, however, to be commended for their forthright statement
of the subjects they chose to exclude from the Project. From the outset, the
Reporters informed the Institute membership that the Complex Litigation Project
would neither study nor consider several issues related to complex litigation: (I)

tortious cause. Statutes of limitations will force most such mass disaster claims to be filed
within a few years of the accident. Those claims can be efficiently brought within the
jurisdiction of the consolidation court. But consolidation of pending actions will not
succeed in aggregating the bulk of the mass exposure claims that are scattered over years
or even over several decades.
Model 2 is proposed on the basis of our reflections on the tort lessons taught by the
litigation crises of DES, asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, and Agent Orange. It provides
augmented collective procedures designed to address large-scale mass disaster cases that
cannot be resolved in a fair and efficient manner by the standard process. Specifically,
in addition to mandatory class actions, Model 2 treats risk as accrued injury, authorizes
insurance fund judgments to cover future, loss from disease or traumatic harm. and
schedules averaged damages for defined subclasses.
Id. at 419-20.
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matters of substantive law, (2) problems of case management, (3) diversity
jurisdiction, and (4) the right to trial by jury.4 ' This list of exclusions and their
rationales remained constant throughout the various drafts and has been
incorporated in the Proposed Final Draft."
Although the list of omissions is briefly stated, the issues deliberately
excluded affect so many aspects of mass tort adjudication that ultimately this list
undermines the seriousness of the Complex Litigation Project itself.
1. Substantive Legal Issues Related to Complex Litigation
In explaining their decision to limit the scope of the Complex Litigation
Project to issues relating to "judicial dispute resolution and matters of procedure,"4 5 the Reporters suggested that any substantive law issues implicated in
complex cases were best left to other experts.46 Proceduralists everywhere can
certainly empathize with the reluctance of the Complex Litigation Project
Reporters-fellow proceduralists-to grapple with the additional burdens of
substantive law. But their stated rationale for this omission seems vague,
overstated, evasive, and perhaps even misguided.4
First, it is disingenuous for the Reporters to suggest that the substantive law
issues that arise in mass tort litigation are very similar to the substantive law
issues "that play a significant role" in all other complex litigation.
The
substantive law issues in mass tort litigation are quite unlike substantive law
issues in almost all other complex federal cases, which helps to make mass tort
complex litigation unique and problematic among other kinds of federal complex
litigation. The singular difference is that in most other federal complex
cases-such as antitrust, securities, employment discrimination, or labor law-the
relevant substantive law has been federalized either by statute or federal common
law. 48 Thus, a ready-made body of federal substantive law exists to provide

43.
44.
45.
46.

See Preliminary Study, supra note 13. at 6-10.
See Proposed Final Draft. supra note I. Ch. I. at 3-7.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4. Inexplaining the reasons for this omission, the Reporters note:
Obviously. the substantive law in each of the areas in which complex litigation arises

also

plays asignificant role in shaping the phenomenon. There are many problems associated
with complex litigation that ultimately might be addressed best by reshaping existing legal
theories or forms of relief, by recognizing new ones, or by developing administrative or
social insurance models for
delivering compensation, when appropriate. However, it is
outside the scope of this Project to attempt to deal comprehensively with substantive law
in addition to the many procedural aspects of the complex litigation problem. The
specific substantive issues implicated vary from one context to the next and may be
addressed most profitably by experts in each relevant field of substantive law, as was done
by the Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility'forPersonal Injury, presented to the
Institute in 1991.
Id.
47.
48.

Id.
See Mullenix, siupra note 6. at 1631-35: Mullenix. Problems in Complex Litigation,supra
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both a legal theory of the case and an available remedy. In addition, in every
other species of federal complex litigation, the same law that provides a
substantive legal theory also typically provides a federal-question jurisdictional
basis for filing in federal district court.
In mass tort cases, in contrast, Congress neither has enacted a federal
substantive tort or products liability law nor has provided a federal subject matter
jurisdictional base for garden-variety tort cases. In every case, whether filed in
state or federal court, state substantive tort law supplies both the legal theory and
the remedy for the alleged injury; if the case is filed in federal court, it must be
on the basis of the court's diversity jurisdiction."9 What makes substantive law
issues in federal mass tort litigation so problematic is the very absence of
federalized substantive tort law. Unable to rely on any federal tort law, state and
federal judges are forced to ascertain and apply complicated choice-of-law rules
to determine the applicable law in multiparty, multiforum mass tort cases. Thus,
complex mass tort cases, since they present unique substantive law problems,
simply cannot be amassed into the general category of other federal substantive
complex cases.
Second, to suggest, as the Reporters do, that "specific substantive issues
implicated vary from one context to the next and may be addressed most
profitably by experts in each relevant field of substantive law,"" is misleading.
If the Reporters mean the entire universe of complex litigation (antitrust,
securities, discrimination, labor law, etc.), then their statement makes sense;
however, according to this reading, their statement refers to issues that have been
solved "by the experts" through federal enactment of substance-specific
legislation. If the Reporters' statement refers to mass tort cases, then it makes
little sense: the only substantive issues in mass tort cases relate to tort law and
remedies, and these issues do not vary from one litigation context to the next.
What varies instead is the complicated scheme of fifty different bodies of state
tort law.
Third, the Reporters' glib dismissal of the implications of substantive law
for complex mass tort cases is troublesome precisely because the intricate
interrelationship of state tort law enmeshed in mass tort cases beckons for
comprehensive treatment. It seems preposterous that the Reporters could, with
any machete-like precision, slice away mass tort procedure from its underlying
state tort law roots. Clearly the artificial banishment of substantive tort law
haunts the Project. For example, the Proposed Final Draft requires a Complex
Litigation Panel and transferee judges to make transactional determinations about
common questions of law and fact. 5' The Reporters solve the issue of common
facts by requiring "minimal commonality" of facts among cases,5" but the

note II.
49.
50.
51.
52.

at 223-25.
Mullenix, Problems inComplex Litigation. supra note II, at 223-25.
Proposed Final Draft. supra note I. Ch. I, at4.
See. e.g., Proposed Final Draft. supra note I, § 301(a)(I).
Id. § 301. cmt. c. at 54-56.
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Reporters never adequately suggest what determines common questions of
law." In a universe of fifty different state law systems, this obviously is a
difficult, if not insolvable, problem.
In contrast, the Reporters for the ALI's Enterprise Responsibility project did

a better job of recognizing the related substantive and procedural dimensions of
mass tort cases,5 and therefore approached mass tort litigation holistically.
Instead of divorcing substance from procedure, these Reporters recognized that
aggregate mass tort procedure could only be designed with a view toward the
distinctive features of mass torts, as torts. For example, the Enterprise
Responsibility Reporters noted that substantive tort problems such as causal
indeterminacy and latent injury-features of many toxic mass torts-require
special procedural mechanisms for aggregating claims and providing remedies
to future claimants. 5 Thus, the Enterprise Responsibility Reporters call for new
procedures based upon the unique substantive challenges of mass tort cases,

rather than for procedures designed in a substantive-law vacuum.

6

Finally, the Reporters erroneously failed to consider administrative or social
insurance models for resolving mass tort cases and delivering compensation.57 By
characterizing these models as matters of extrajudicial dispute resolution (let alone
substantive law), the Reporters removed them from the purview of the Complex

Litigation Project; therefore, the Project did not assess any existing non-adjudicative experiments for resolving mass tort cases, such as the Asbestos Claims
Facility, 58 the Center for Claims Resolution,59 or the Manville Trust.W° In a
social and political environment that now encourages recourse to methods of
alternative dispute resolution,6 ' the Reporters prematurely excised from the

53. Id. § 301, cmt. c. at56. stating: "At the other extreme, consolidation based solely on
common questions of law, when there are no overlapping facts tying the cases together, would be
impermissible.... Rulings on abstract questions of law would not produce sufficient benefits to
outweigh the disruption caused by transfer and consolidation under those circumstances."
54. See Enterprise Responsibility, supra note 30, at 383-439.
55. Id. at 385-86, 389-93.
56. By viewing the phenomenon of mass tort cases holistically, the Enterprise Responsibility
Reporters.at least discussed the need to consider other methods of resolving these cases, such as
bankruptcy proceedings, settlement, test cases and pattem settlement, claim and issue preclusion,
insurance funds, and damage scheduling. Id. at 402-29.
57. Id.
58. See Mullenix, Beyond Consolidatio,: Postaggregative Procedure inAsbestos Mass Tort
Litigation, supra note II. at 555 n.386; Mullenix, Problems in Complex Litigation. supra note Ii,

at 227-29.
59.
60.

Mullenix. Problems inComplex Litigation, supro note II.
at 228-29.
Valle S. Dutcher, The Asbestos Dragon:
The Ramifications of Creative Judicial

Management of Asbestos Cases, 10 Pace L. Rev. 955, 993-1004 (1993); Deborah R. Hensler
Fashioning a National Resolution of Asbestos Personal hIjury Litigation: A Reply to Professor

Brickmat. 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1967, 1981-83 (1992); Marianna S.Smith, Resolving Asbestos Claims:
The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1990, at 27, 27-34.

61. The President's Council on Competitiveness, A Report, Agenda For Civil Justice Reform
in America (August, 1991).
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Complex Litigation Project any consideration of non-litigated resolutions of these
massive disputes. Thus, the Reporters donned litigation blinders early, to the
detriment of the Complex Litigation Project.
2. Problems of Complex Mass Tort Case Management
The collection of problems omitted from the Complex Litigation Project,
conveniently grouped under the heading of "case management," constitutes a
significant understatement of the practical litigation problems that the Reporters
simply chose to exclude from their study of complex litigation. The case
management problems that the Reporters elected not to address include the scope
and management of discovery; organization of counsel in multiparty actions; trial
scheduling, preparation, and management; and the administration of relief.62 The
rationale for these exclusions rests on the Reporters' desire to "avoid duplicative
analysis of matters that have been or are being addressed elsewhere,"6 and the
optimistic assertion that other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Manual for
Complex Litigation are adequate to these tasks.6
This list of exclusions is somewhat remarkable; the Reporters managed to write
a 700 page study of complex litigation that does not confront the complexities of
litigation. Surely litigation means something other than transfer and consolidation
of cases-processes that merely are the prelude to litigation. And choice-of-law
questions, the other major focus of the Complex Litigation Project, address the
problem of which substantive law applies to a consolidated case once the case has
been transferred to a single forum. Resolving the "applicable law" problem is
therefore also a prelude to actual litigation and does not itself deal with case
management issues. The Complex Litigation Project Reporters chose not to deal
with any postaggregative procedural problems, a stunning omission in a work that
purports to deal with recommending reforms for mass tort dispute resolution.

See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, Ch. 1, at 4.
Id.
id. at 4-5. In explaining their lack of treatment of these subjects, the Reporters suggest:
Case management difficulties, although certainly "complexities" in the litigation process.
are elements of a phenomenon more global than multiparty, multiforom lawsuits-the
problem of protracted litigation. Although complex litigation often involves case
management problems, protraction is by no means limited to this category of cases. Some
of the most notorious protracted cases have been structurally simple two-party lawsuits.
The Manual for Complex Litigation sets forth techniques for managing protracted
litigation that have been used successfully in the past and currently are available to federal
judges. These devices have been reinforced by the 1983 amendments to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 7, II, 16, and 26, and the growing number of cost and delay reduction
plans being adopted by district courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.
Accordingly, the Project does not pursue additional practice revisions aimed at the general
problem of protracted litigation. Rather, continued improvement in this area may occur
as the Manual, the new Federal Rules. and the local plans gain wider acceptance, and as
further experimentation with their techniques is undertaken.

62.
63.
64.
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Moreover, the Reporters' reasons for excluding case management issues
from their purview seem at once both disingenuousand peculiarly naive. It is
disingenuous for the Reporters to suggest that they chose not. to grapple with
postaggregative procedure in order to avoid duplicative efforts by other
bodies. 65 That Congress," the American Bar Association, 67 and other groups
such as the Federal Courts Study Committee" simultaneously addressed the
issues of multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction and choice-of-law did not deter the
Complex Litigation Project Reporters from studying these issues and making
essentially duplicative (but not precisely overlapping) recommendations. Indeed,
since these other law reform groups primarily focused their attention on the same
issues of jurisdiction, transfer, and choice-of-law as it relates to mass tort cases,
and did not address issues of postaggregative procedure, it now appears all the
more compelling that the Reporters should have studied case management
problems.
The Reporters' assertion that other rules adequately deal with mass tort case
management is simply naive. Both the Manual for Complex Litigation and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially those rules relating to discovery and
case management, have been regularly revised during the last half-dozen years.
One can only assume that revisions are necessary because the existing rules have
proven inadequate to the tasks of governing both simple and complex civil
litigation. In addition, the Reporters' suggestion that the case management
problems of mass tort cases are similar to those of other complex cases seems
as misguided as their suggestion that the substantive law problems of mass tort
cases are the same as other complex cases. 69
If We have learned anything from the few mass tort cases that have
progressed to the point of postaggregative adjudication, it is that these cases
present novel issues of postaggregative procedure relating precisely to the list of
problems the Complex Litigation Project Reporters chose to ignore: discovery,
organization of counsel, trial scheduling, preparation and management, and
administration of forms of relief.7" The lessons of the Cintino7" and School
Asbestos Litigation72 instruct that ordinary procedural rules, even augmented by
suggestions from the Complex Litigation Manual, do not adequately meet the

65. Id.
66. See the various versions of the Multiparty, Multifonam Jurisdiction Act, supra note 5.
67. Report to the House of Delegates, 1989 A.B.A. Comm'n on Mass Torts, Rep. 126 (1989).
68. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (April 2, 1990); see also Committee on
Federal Courts of the New York State Bar Association. Improvig Jur. Comprehension in Complex
Civil Litigation. 62 St. John's L. Rev. 549 (1988).
69. See supra note 64.
70.
See generally Mullenix. Beiond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos
Mass Tort Litigation. supra note I1:MLllenix. Problems in Complex Litigation. supra note II. at

225-27.
71. Cimino v. Raymark Indus.. 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
72. hi re Asbestos School Litigation, 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd in part, 789 F.2d
996 (3d Cir. 1986).
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complicated tasks of case management where courts have joined essentially
individualized tort injury cases into an aggregate mass tort litigation."
In the absence of case management rules tailored to the special problems of
mass torts, federal judges have been creating case management techniques as
they go along, frequently over the objections of plaintiff and defense counsel.
Mass tort cases, as opposed to other federal litigation, present a tension between
the desire for individualized proof of tort injury and the judicial system's desire
for efficient processing of claims. To mediate these conflicting goals, federal
judges who have handled mass tort cases have resorted to creative compromise
measures.
In Cinino v. Raymark, for example, Judge Parker agreed to individual
depositions and physical examinations of more than three thousand plaintiffs, but
subjected this discovery to severe time, place, and manner restrictions. 4 Judge
Parker attempted to bridge the gap between individualized and aggregate
procedure and to mediate the compting demands of the litigants' right to
individualized adjudication and the system's desire for efficient case management. Similarly, in the School Asbestos Litigation; Judge Kelly imposed
restrictive scheduling limitations on the depositions of expert witnesses." In
both instances, the judges' creative discovery measures were challenged by both
plaintiff and defense counsel. 6
Mass tort discovery presents different case management problems beyond
ordinary time, place, and manner restrictions. Judge Jack Weinstein, who has
overseen both the Agent Orange Litigation and the Brooklyn Navy Shipyard
asbestos cases, has suggested that the entire subject of protective orders should
be revisited in the context of mass tort litigation." Based on a communitarian
legal philosophy, Judge Weinstein controversially suggests that the public's right
to learn of information disclosed in mass tort discovery should outweigh
traditional litigant rights to privilege and immunity from disclosure. 8
Finally, the entire subject of discovery is currently in procedural disarray, and
ongoing reform efforts may be inadequate if not counterproductive to the conduct
of mass tort litigation. For the last half-dozen years, the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules has been revising the entire package of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure relating to civil discovery." The two key features of these reforms are

73.

See Mullenix. Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort

Litigation, supra note tI (discussing postaggregative procedure in the Cimino and School Asbestos
Litigation).

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 531-34.
Id. at 534-37.
Id. at 531-37.
Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigationi. 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 469,

516 (1994).
78. ld at 513.
79. See Amendments to Fedcral Rules of Civil Procedure (effective Dec. I, 1993), reprinted
in 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over E.rperience: Mandatory
hifonnal Discovery and the PoliticsofRulemaking, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 795 (1991); Randall Samborn,
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a provision for mandatory exchange of information at the outset of a lawsuit, and
severe limitations on formal discovery devices such as depositions and interrogatories.8o Although the Advisory Committee's proposed discovery reforms were
passed by the Judicial Conference, transmitted by the Supreme Court to Congress,
and subsequently enacted into law, these discovery reforms were accompanied by
great debate and legislative jockeying. The final word on civil discovery reform
has not yet been written, with intimations that Congress may yet undertake its own
set of civil discovery reforms during the spring session of 1994.1
Nonetheless, these reforms of the basic discovery rules seem totally inapt for
complex cases, let alone complex mass tort cases. To imagine that both sides will
simply hand over the bulk of their discovery information-information that neither
side is likely to possess at the outset of a complex mass tort case-within the
severely constricted period.mandated by the Federal Rules, borders the fantastic.
Moreover, the equally severe limitations on depositions and interrogatories are
ludicrous given the context ofcomplex multiparty, multi forum mass tort litigation.
Recourse, of course, probably will continue to be found in the vague and
aspirational suggestions of the Manual for Complex Litigation, 2 a Manual drafted
in response to an earlier era of federalized complex litigation, not mass tort
cases.83 Moreover, the litigation landscape is now additionally cluttered by
discovery reforms that have been recommended by each federal district court under
the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act."4 Pursuant to this legislation, each federal
district court shall issue a report and plan for civil justice reform by the end of
1993, plans which are to include recommendations, measures, and rules of the
conduct of discovery. 85 Whether individual district courts will provide separate
discovery rules for complex or mass tort cases will vary from district to district, as
will the discovery rules themselves."
A mass tort litigant, under the transfer and consolidation regime provided by
the Complex Litigation Project, is left adrift with regard to post-consolidation

Derailing the Rules, Nat'l L.J., May 24, 1993, at 1;Randall Sambom, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited,

Nat'l L. J., May 4.1992. at i Carl Tobias, Congressand the 1993 Civil Rules Proposals, 148 F.R.D.
383 (1993); Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139 (1993).
80. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 79, at 430-41.
81. See Linda S.Mullenix, Podium: Should Congress Decide Civil Rules, Nat'l L.J., November
22, 1993, at 15-16; Randall Sambom. New Discovery Rules Take Effect, Nat'l L.J., December 6.
1993, at 3; see also Civil Rules Amendments Act of 1993. H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993).
82. Manual for Complex Litigation (Second) (1985).
83. Manual for Complex Litigation ix (1978). The Manual was written in response to the wave
of federal antitrust prosecutions of the manufacturers of electronic equipment in the 1960s.
84. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650. 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
85. See generaly Linda S. Mullenix. The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice,77 Minn.
L. Rev. 375 (1992) (describing the Civil Justice Reform Act and its legislative history); Carl Tobias.
Civil Justice Refon Roadinap. 142 F.R.D. 507 (1992); Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil
Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49 (1992).
86. See Courts and Procedure, New Disco very Rules, 62 U.S.L.W. 2449, 2450 (Jan. 25, 1994)

(reporting that 28 of 94 federal district courts have announced they will not follow mandatory
disclosure rules).
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discovery rules. Will such cases be subject to the Manual for Complex Litigation,

the discovery rules of some particular federal district court or another, or whatever
the transferee judge elects to create, impose, or improvise? Since under the Civil
Justice Reform Act we can now expect balkanized rather than uniform civil
discovery rules, 87 may we now expect litigant forum-shopping for preferred
discovery provisions in mass tort cases? Might we have been better if the Reporters
had chosen, despite the possibility of duplicative efforts, to have offered some
suggested guidelines for discovery and other case management techniques, rather
than leaving these issues for "experimentation" in the ninety-four federal district
courts?
The other case management issues that the Reporters declined to consider are
also vexing in mass tort cases, and these issues are not usefully ignored by
suggesting they are akin to the same issues in other complex cases. Mass tort cases
have presented unique issues of counsel organization and financing, as Judge
Weinstein experienced in the Agent Orange Litigation." Trial scheduling,
preparation, and management in mass tort cases have also raised issues concerning
the use of special masters and polyfurcated trials that are dissimilar to other
complex casesY 9 Finally, the Cinuino case, the Agent Orange Litigation, and the
Manville Asbestos Trust, all have raised difficult and unique issues relating to relief
administration, including novel issues of damage sampling and scheduling. 9° Yet
these issues failed to rouse the attention of the Complex Litigation Project
Reporters. Since most of these issues are not being addressed by other law reform
groups, the Project's Reporters have left avast procedural chasm concerning some
of the most difficult issues of actually processing consolidated mass tort cases.
3. Diversity Jurisdiction and Mass Tort Litigation
At the outset of the Complex Litigation Project, the Project's Reporters also
indicated they would not address the relationship of complex litigation to any

87. See Mullenix, supra note 85. at 380-82: Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Refor and the
Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 Ariz. St. L.J. 1393 (1992); see also Courts and
Procedure, New Discovery Rules. supra note 86.

88. See generally Peter H. Schuck. Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts
(1986).
89. See Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation,supra note I1,at 540-50 (role of court adjuncts such
as special masters and court-appointed expert witnesses); 557-68 (trial staging and polyfurcated
trials).
90. See. e.g.. Cimino v. Raymark Indus.. 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (damage
scheduling in over 3000 consolidated asbestos claims); hi re Johns-Manville Corp.. 36 B.R. 743
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (appointing class representatives for asbestos tort victims with claims not-yet
ripened). See also Michael J. Saks & Peter D. Blanck. Justice hnproved: The Unrecognized Benefits
ofAggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts. 44 Stan. L. Rev. 815 (1992): Michael J.
Saks. Do We Really Know Anyhing About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why
Not?. 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147 (1992); Sympositn on Problems itt Disposition of Mass Related Cases
and Proposals for Change. 10 Rev. Litig. 209 (1991).
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possible revision of federal diversity jurisdiction.9 Not much needs be said about
this decision, other than to reaffirm the Reporters' wisdom in adopting this course.
The Proposed Final Draft is neither the better nor the worse for this omission.
What is peculiar, however, is that the Reporters deliberately mentioned this
omission in the Proposed Final Draft. In a Project that otherwise has eliminated
any discussion, analysis, or recommendations concerning federal subject matter
jurisdiction (other than its removal jurisdiction),92 why did the Reporters single
out the tired diversity debate as unworthy of inclusion in the Project?
One suspects that this particular exclusion was introduced in the original 1987
Preliminary Study 93 at a time when the Reporters fully intended to draft a new
subject malterjurisdictional statute for mass tort cases.g4 Recognizing at that time
that all federal mass tort cases were filed in federal court under its diversity
jurisdiction, the Reporters anticipated that any statute they drafted might in some
way modify the court's diversity jurisdiction. However, also recognizing the
historical attempts to eliminate diversityjurisdiction, the Reporters no doubt issued
this preemptive cautionary note to the Institute's membership to forestall, if not
prevent, a highly charged political debate over the desirability of the federal court's
diversity jurisdiction.
As events developed, the Reporters subsequently issued, withdrew, and finally
abandoned a subject matter jurisdictional proposal that looked very much like a
modified diversity statute. What remains of that effort, in the Proposed Final Draft,
is an odd defensive note concerning a chimerical problem. When the Reporters
have not given us afederal subject matter jurisdictional statute, why should we care
that they consciously chose not to revisit the old diversity debate?
4. The Right to TrialBy Jury
The fourth broad category of issues that the Reporters chose to exclude from
their Project was the right to trial by jury.93 For the Reporters, the relationship of

91. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I. Ch. 1.at 6. The Reporters offered arather succinct
reason for their avoidance of this issue:
When considering various options it should be recognized that some aspects of the law
that affect complex litigation may not be feasible targets for reformation. A good
example is the oft-repeated call to scale back diversity jurisdiction. This issue has
continued to be debated, often acrimoniously, by various segments of the profession. The
1988 legislation increasing thie jurisdictional amount requirement to $50,000 in diversity
cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), may reduce the decible level of that controversy for the
foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the acceptability of the proposals developed by this
Complex Litigation Project should not be tied to the outcome of that debate. The
diversity issue should be left for separate resolution in the political arena.

Id.
92.
93.
94.
95.
exclusion

See discussion supra at II. A. I. and accompanying notes.
See Preliminary Study, supra note 13. at 8-9.
See supra note 92.
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, Ch. I. at 6-7. The Reporters' statement of this
is rather brief:
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this right to complex litigation centers on the suitability of lay juries in complex
cases.9 The Reporters chose to omit any analysis of Seventh Amendment issues,
declaring the right to be "largely immutable and [of a] constitutional nature"" and
therefore not suitable for inclusion in the Project.
It is difficult to know what to make of this rationale for excluding jury-trial
issues from the Project, and what it means to declare an issue "immutable and
constitutional." Certainly the Reporters were not chary of dealing with other
constitutional issues, as they amply demonstrated throughout their successive
draftings of jurisdictional proposals relating either to the original or supplemental
jurisdiction of the federal courts.98
Moreover, the Reporters' exclusive characterization of the Seventh Amendment issue as one of jury comprehension only, fails to capture the multiple
possibilities for Seventh Amendment challenges that already have arisen in many
mass tort cases. Indeed, in most instances where federal judges have attempted
creative innovations in mass tort litigation, aggrieved litigants have suggested that
certain case management procedures (rather than the presentation ofevidence) have
denied them a right to trial by jury. For example, decisions to aggregate cases
either under Rule 23 or 42 have been challenged on Seventh Amendment
grounds, 99 as have decisions to use special masters,'0° to conduct discovery in
a certain fashion,' 0 ' to polyfurcate the stages of a trial,' 02 and to use damage
sampling techniques. 0 3 Moreover, Seventh Amendment challenges to innovative
trial procedure typically have been accompanied by Due Process challenges." °
Certainly the problem of jury comprehension in complex cases presents a
Seventh Amendment issue, but the Project's Reporters seem cognizant of this
problem only as it arose in pre-mass ton cases such as antitrust and securities

Another source of controversy in the complex litigation context is the right to trial by
jury. A number of observers have argued forcefully that some extraordinarily complex
lawsuits present factual issues that are beyond the commentary of lay juries to decide.
Nevertheless, the largely immutable and constitulional nature of the jury trial right,
together with the political volatility of any attempt to alter it. suggest that the Institute
would accomplish little by advocating any broad changes in the role played by juries in
complex cases.
Id. (footnote omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Mullenix. supra note 4,at 206-23.
99. See i re Fibrcboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990).
100. See Mullenix. Beyond Consolidation, supro note II,at 543 (discussing defendants'
objections to use of special masters in Cimino v. Rayntark).
101.
Fiberboard Corp.. 893 F.2d at 709 (refusing to consider constitutional challenge to
discovery limitations imposed by district Judge Parker).
102. See Mullenix. Beyond Cosolidation,. supr note II, at 557 (discussing Seventh Amendment
objections to polyfurcated trial plans).
103.
104.

See Saks & Blanck, sispra note 90.
See. e.g., Fiberboard Corp.. 893 F.2d 706.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

litigation.'
If the Complex Litigation Project is intended to deal with mass
tort litigation as it has manifested itself since the mid-1980s, then the Reporters'
vision of Seventh Amendment problems raised by these cases is peculiarly
narrow and uniformed by the actual experience of mass tort cases.
In the new universe of complex mass tort litigation, judges, lawyers, and
litigants ought to have some sense of which aggregate procedure is constitutionally permissible and which innovative procedure is not. To eliminate analysis
of such fundamental litigation rights by characterizing the issues as "immutable,
constitutional, and political," seems an inexcusable evasion and omission.
C. Problems Inadvertently Ignored
Having chronicled those proposals that mysteriously vanished from the
Complex Litigation Project and those that were deliberately omitted, it seems
rather gratuitous to add that the Reporters also inadvertently ignored another vista
of mass tort litigation. I refer here to the ethical or professional, responsibility
issues raised by these cases, a set of problems largely ignored' in the academic
literature and by the ALI in all three of its projects dealing with Complex
Litigation, Enterprise Responsibility, and the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers.'06 That the ethical dimensions of mass tort litigation were not
included in the Reporter's Preliminary Study is neither surprising nor faulty.
One may forgive the Complex Litigation Reporters for this oversight because, at
the time the Project began in 1986, many of the ethical problems that Judge Jack
Weinstein has now so ably catalogued'0 7 had not yet been witnessed.
Judge Jack Weinstein has now completed a yeoman's job of describing the
ethical issues experienced in complex mass tort litigation, a discussion that
ranges over problems in client solicitation, client loyalty, fee arrangements,
financing litigation, discovery and disclosure, privileges and immunities,
conflicts-of-interest, judicial surrogates, representational litigation, and myriad
other professional responsibility issues. 10 8 Through his hands-on exposure
to the Agent Orange and asbestos mass tort litigations, Judge Weinstein
contends that mass tort cases raise distinctive ethical problems that conventional

105. See Mullenix. Beuiond Consolidation. supra note 11.at 565-66 (discussing jury
comprehension issues).
106. See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers (forthcoming).
This author is an Associate Reporter on the Restatement and, as I have disclosed elsewhere, was
chastised by Judge Jack Weinstein at the May 1993 ALI Annual Meeting for my failure to include
any discussion of ethical issues relating to mass tort cases in my sections of this Restatement. Judge
Weinstein is indeed correct that the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers does not deal with
ethical issues peculiar to the class of mass tort cases, see Weinstein, supra note 77, and Linda S.
Mullenix, Mass Tons As Public hiterest Law: Paradigm Misplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579 n.*
(1994).
107. Weinstein, supra note 77.
108. Id.
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professional responsibility codes do not address adequately and that need to be
addressed by law reform bodies.'0
Whether one agrees with Judge Weinstein's diagnosis of the problems or his
prescriptions for reform," 0 his article highlights a dimension of mass tort
litigation that has been completely overlooked and neglected by law reformers.
Meanwhile, these ethical problems surface in every new mass tort litigation filed
in state and federal courts; judges, lawyers, and litigants have scarce or, at best,
inapt guideposts to professionally responsible conduct in mass tort cases. One
hopes that while the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers progresses, the
Reporters for that project will heed Judge Weinstein's suggestion that that project
address the ethical problems involved in mass tort cases. Unfortunately, the
Complex Litigation Project's swan song at the May 1993 Annual Meeting did
not include a chorus discussing the ethical problems of complex litigation.
Ill. CONCLUSION
What should we make of an American Law Institute effort that styles itself
the Complex Litigation Project but fails to deal with complex litigation? In the
end, the 700 pages of this Project may be reduced to this: The Reporters have
enhanced the old multidistrict litigation statute and have offered an elaborate
choice-of-law scheme largely modeled on the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
of Law. Well, Congress also has been working on these two items for the past
seven years, only their work product is 680 pages shorter. Will either serve us
better?
From the beginning, the Complex Litigation Project suffered from a peculiar
identity crisis (identity complex?) exemplified by its persistence in calling itself
the Complex Litigation Project, rather than the Mass Tort Litigation Project. The
Project was not really intended to deal with complex federal cases, but with one
species of complex cases that began to present idiosyncratic problems in the mid1980s: the mass tort litigation.
Mass tort litigation is unlike other federal complex litigation, and the
Project's failure to delineate these distinctions muddied the Institute's effort to
provide a model for fair and efficient mass tort procedure. The Reporters
mistakenly tried to assimilate mass tort cases into a generalized complex
litigation model, while simultaneously trying to prescribe special procedures

109. Id. In addition to identifying ethical problems raised in mass tort
cases, Judge Weinstein
also makes numerous recommendations concerning how he believes these ethical problems ought to
be handled, based on a communitarian legal philosophy.
110. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 106 (disagreeing that the ethical problems Judge Weinstein
identifies are peculiar to mass tort
cases and questioning whether ethics reform need be based on a
theory of communitarian ethics); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.. Reflections on Judge Weinstein's
Ethical Dilemmas in Moss Tort Litigation. 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 569 (1994); Thomas W. Henderson
& Tybe A. Brett, A Trial Lawyer's Commentary on One Jurist's Musing ofthe Legal Occult: A
Response to Judge Weinstein, 88 Nw. L. Rev. 592 (1994).
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tailored for mass tort cases. Ultimately, this tension resulted in a cautionary,
politically compromised solution to an ill-defined set of problems that is a mere
enhancement of existing procedure.
And oh-what they left out! First, the Complex Litigation Project divorced
itself from substantive tort law and decided to prescribe procedure in a
substantive vacuum. Then, the Complex Litigation Project failed to discuss or
analyze federal subject matter jurisdiction, the relationship of its consolidation
procedures to class actions and other federal consolidation devices; any aspect
of postaggregative procedure and case management, including but not limited to
discovery, organization of counsel, trial staging, and forms of relief. The
Complex Litigation Project left out discussion of methods of alternative dispute
resolution, administrative and extrajudicial auspices for claim processing,
bankruptcy proceedings, and the use of court surrogates, such as special masters.
The Complex Litigation Project left out analysis of the constitutional due process
and jury trial issues. And the Complex Litigation Project left out discussion of
the ethical implications raised by mass tort cases. In short, the Complex
Litigation Project told us virtually nothing about complex mass tort litigation.
Surely something admirable may be found amid this dour commentary, and
it is this: For all its faults and omissions, the Complex Litigation Project is a
scholar's work and a scholar's monument. Like the two movements of Franz
Schubert's Unfinished Symphony in B minor, perhaps the Proposed Final Draft
will inspire other scholars to compose those movements that remain unwritten.

